> -------- Original-Nachricht --------
> Datum: Mon, 29 May 2006 18:38:30 +0300
> Von: Gisle Sælensminde wrote:
> > A first step could be to describe loop-aes and cryptoloop, like done for
> > the random-device in the paper I linked to.
>
Fine that you do this analysis of the loop-aes crypto system right now...
But as you already assumed, I am not a crypto analyst. So far I trust in the aes cipher, gpg and Jaris work. As the userbasis is rather small I suppose the FBI didn`t do a code analysis yet. Looks fine, doesn`t it?
Sure, I can`t write C or assembler code. Of course I don`t try writting loop-aes clones. So far I animated Jari to include instructions for using usb-sticks to boot from. Loop-aes can be set up to boot the system with no partition table. So there remains nothing that could tell attackers that you are using loop-aes. What looks crypto analysis like when you don`t know which kind of system you attack? Maybe you assume that loop-aes is used? In this case you still don`t know partitions or offsets. And of course you don`t know how many layers of encryption I used. Maybe I used 4 loops for some part of some disk...
Again, I agree with your concerns about how loop-aes is taylored. But you still missed to give reasons why setting up more than one loop device per partition decreases security. Mixing up things always leads to a higher degree of freedom and this will decrease chances for crypto analysis, too. Right?
Regards,
Peter
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Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/
