Re: loop-AES with ReiserFS for file-backed loop?

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Anon wrote:
Anon wrote:
Could I then use ReiserFS on top of a file backed loop device?


the loop-AES.README also states: 1. Loop device primer [...] File backed loops may deadlock under some kernel + file system combinations. So, if you can choose between device backed and file backed, choose device backed even if it means that you have to re-partition your disks.

I *am* planning on using a device-backed loop.
so, file backed loops SHOULD be avoided, no matter if encrypted or not, with journaling fs on it or without. yes, it's possible and you SHOULD try it to see if it works for you. but in "most cases" file backed loops are behaving better.

I assume you really meant device-backed loops in the last sentance above. My interest in using a file-backed loop is so that I can have a loop-AES device-backed loop containing a loop-AES file-backed loop, for two (or more) layers of encryption. I have the impression from the loop-AES.README file a non-journalling file system can be used in a file-backed loop. It is my understanding from the ReiserFS documentation that using the "nolog" option during mounting would satisfy the non-journalling criteria, as this option disables journalling.

For that scenario you only 'need' a filesystem for the last layer.

You pack an encryption layer onto the partion/device.
"losetup" it and losetup the next layer directly onto the newly created /dev/loop<x> device.

That way you only stack block-devices and pack a filesystem on the last one.

For a (say) 4 layer encryption you would stack;

HDD -> Partition
-> Loop 1 -> Loop 2 -> Loop 3 -> Loop 4
-> Filesystem

e.g.
sdb -> sdb1 -> loop0 -> loop1 -> loop2 -> loop3 -> <whatever>

If you want you can also pack the encryption keys before each layer using the "offset"-options to leave the needed space for the keys and shrink the block-device of each layer by a little bit.

That way you had to actually break each encryption layer to even get the needed keys for the next. (Of course the key-sets are also encrypted with by gpg or whatever else layer you may think of)




Bis denn

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