=20 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- This article was sent to you by someone who found it on SF Gate. The original article can be found on SFGate.com here: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=3D/chronicle/archive/2002/12= /16/MN86370.DTL ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Monday, December 16, 2002 (SF Chronicle) Beleaguered FAA braces for more turbulence/In wake of Alaska crash report, = agency to keep eye on United Henry K. Lee, Chronicle Staff Writer It's been tough times lately for the Federal Aviation Administration, which was slammed for lax oversight in the crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 and even before the tragedy was accused of widespread deficiencies. Now, the FAA says it will step up its scrutiny of bankrupt United Airlines. Some fear it may not be up to the job. "The FAA is a hugely reactive bureaucracy, more reactive than I've ever seen before," said Gerald Sterns, an Oakland attorney who represents relatives of airplane crash victims. The National Transportation Safety Board determined last week that an Alaska MD-80 twin-engine jet crashed into the Pacific on Jan. 31, 2000, because of the lack of grease on the jackscrew, a major tail component. All 88 people aboard died. In making its findings, the board painted an unflattering portrait of the FAA, accusing the agency of shoddy oversight of a rapidly growing airline. In papers submitted to the board, the Air Line Pilots Association, the pilots union, accused FAA officials of being too close to Alaska's brass, resulting in "inaction and ineffectiveness." FAA officials say they are making improvements -- while stressing that there is no way the agency can be expected to solve every problem or prevent every crash. "It's a daunting task," said Mike Fergus, a spokesman for the FAA in Renton, Wash., the office that oversees Alaska Airlines, based in Seattle. But "I think our track record speaks for itself, in spite of this extremely tragic anomaly." The FAA was created in 1958 to replace the Civil Aeronautics Authority. For years, its congressional mandate was to both regulate and promote the aviation industry. The FAA served as a safety watchdog, conducting inspections and issuing fines, while at the same time acting as a cheerleader for airlines. "It was a schizophrenic mission," Sterns said. But the fatal crash of ValuJet Flight 592 in the Florida Everglades in 1996 changed that. The FAA was accused of overlooking serious safety problems at the low-fare airline, and its charter was amended to make safety its single mission. "I think that the FAA has problems that started with the day it was born, because it had to be a partner" with the airlines, said Mary Schiavo, a frequent critic of airline safety, former inspector general of the federal Department of Transportation and author of the book "Flying Blind, Flying Safe. " The FAA has been lambasted in some way after each major fatal crash over the past decade, Schiavo said. OVERSIGHT PROGRAM In response to the ValuJet crash, the FAA adopted the Air Transportation Oversight System, in which 500 of the agency's 3,300 aviation safety inspectors were responsible for monitoring the nation's 10 largest airlines. Under the program, inspectors identify dangerous trends through reports entered into a database. In April, four years after the system was announced, the Department of Transportation's inspector general said the FAA still hadn't gotten around to fully implementing it. Inspectors were confused and assigned to locations where they were not needed most, and the FAA did not have a plan to expand the program to the 129 remaining U.S. carriers, the report said. In response, Nick Sabatini, associate FAA administrator for regulation a= nd certification, said the agency had reached many of the same conclusions and that all inspectors would be trained within six months. In a newspaper opinion piece last week, Sabatini said improvements were being made and that "today, FAA inspectors have better tools to ensure airlines live up to their responsibility." But as recently as this spring, two Alaska Airlines planes were found to have been inadequately lubricated, said Richard Rodriguez, safety board investigator in charge of the Alaska crash probe. As a result, Rodriguez recommended last week that the safety board call for another round of in-depth FAA inspections of the carrier. "If I was in charge, I'd look at Alaska," Rodriguez said. "I'm not so sure I would agree with that," said a testy John Goglia, a safety board member who feared that focusing unduly on Alaska would take away from inspections at other airlines. United, which filed for bankruptcy last week, will be among the carriers that will face heightened FAA inspections. Ultimately, the safety board opted against calling on the FAA to conduct another review of Alaska on the grounds that it would spread the agency too thin. That fear comes up repeatedly in crash investigations, Schiavo said. Aft= er the fatal crash of American Airlines Flight 1420 in Little Rock, Ark., in 1999, "the FAA complained that American Airlines slipped through their fingers because they were too busy watching ValuJet," Schiavo said. 'BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT' Bill Waldock, associate director of the Center for Aerospace Safety Education at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Ariz., said he was willing to give the FAA the benefit of the doubt. Waldock noted that the agency's role is strictly oversight. "They're the= re to make sure everybody else is doing the job right," he said. "They're not to do the job themselves." There is little recourse for those who believe the agency isn't doing a good enough job. The FAA is largely immune from civil liability because it's known as a "discretionary organization" -- it doesn't have to do anything -- said Los Angeles attorney Paul Hedlund. That's why his claim against the FAA on behalf of 13 families of Flight 261 victims went nowhere. "We're not going to have a perfect anything, but it's absolutely fair, in my opinion, to criticize them," Hedlund said. "They're woefully inadequate to the task. It's a hard job, but that doesn't mean we can't do better." E-mail Henry K. Lee at hlee@sfchronicle.com.=20 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2002 SF Chronicle