Some people won't be connected to the Internet during install, so you
would have to ask the user to connect to the Internet (maybe use the
code from the net install?)
Darren VanBuren
-------------------------
Sent from my iPod
On Dec 2, 2008, at 13:55, Máirí n Duffy <duffy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Till Maas wrote:
On Tue December 2 2008, Máirín Duffy wrote:
Ricky Zhou wrote:
22:10 < ricky> Somebody suggested that we have a link to
http://fedoraproject.org/verify on the get-fedora pages. I
wonder where
that should go... 22:10 < ricky> Hopefully, we can make it fit in
with
the friendliness of the page, if you know what I mean
Before we add another link to the page, can we get a bit more of the
context on how users are expected to interact with these sums? How
often
do users typically use these?
Everytime users download a new iso image, they should verify it
using the SHA1SUM file to ensure that nobody tampered it.
But do they do this? I certainly don't. Who's to say if someone
compromised the ISO downloads that the SHA1SUM files were also not
compromised?
Is there any way to automate this verification process?
The verification has to be done using tools that are not located
located on the iso file. Otherwise someone could tamper the tools
on the iso file. But Fedora could provide a tool that accepts a iso
image and SHA1SUM-file and reports to the user, whether or not the
image was verified.
Can it automatically download the SHA1SUM file from a pre-
established URL?
Isn't there an option to verify your media when you go through
anaconda?
This option cannot ensure that nobody tampered the iso image.
It doesn't do what I suggested above?
Is there a way we could provide only the relevant sum after the
user has downloaded an ISO? (for example, the
user clicks on the "Download Now!" link for the desktop live
media, and
they get a direct link to the iso and in the background the page
reloads
to a page with the sum for the desktop live media iso and
instructions
on how to use it?)
I believe this is not technically not possible without using
Javascript. However it would be possible to create only one big
SHA1SUM file for all released iso images additionally to have
several. But this requires someone with access to the secret gpg
keys to do this.
Would that require the user to download all iso images?
Are these sums something we only expect more advanced users to
care about?
I guess currently only more advanced users know the security risk
that exists, if they do not verify the iso images. I also guess
that if less advanced users know these, they would verify the iso
images, too.
But our job is to get users the software bits, not to educate them
on everything that could possibly go wrong in their doing so, right?
~m
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