Till Maas wrote:
On Tue December 2 2008, Máirín Duffy wrote:
Ricky Zhou wrote:
22:10 < ricky> Somebody suggested that we have a link to
http://fedoraproject.org/verify on the get-fedora pages. I wonder where
that should go... 22:10 < ricky> Hopefully, we can make it fit in with
the friendliness of the page, if you know what I mean
Before we add another link to the page, can we get a bit more of the
context on how users are expected to interact with these sums? How often
do users typically use these?
Everytime users download a new iso image, they should verify it using the
SHA1SUM file to ensure that nobody tampered it.
But do they do this? I certainly don't. Who's to say if someone
compromised the ISO downloads that the SHA1SUM files were also not
compromised?
Is there any way to automate this
verification process?
The verification has to be done using tools that are not located located on
the iso file. Otherwise someone could tamper the tools on the iso file. But
Fedora could provide a tool that accepts a iso image and SHA1SUM-file and
reports to the user, whether or not the image was verified.
Can it automatically download the SHA1SUM file from a pre-established URL?
Isn't there an option to verify your media when
you go through anaconda?
This option cannot ensure that nobody tampered the iso image.
It doesn't do what I suggested above?
Is there a way we could provide only the
relevant sum after the user has downloaded an ISO? (for example, the
user clicks on the "Download Now!" link for the desktop live media, and
they get a direct link to the iso and in the background the page reloads
to a page with the sum for the desktop live media iso and instructions
on how to use it?)
I believe this is not technically not possible without using Javascript.
However it would be possible to create only one big SHA1SUM file for all
released iso images additionally to have several. But this requires someone
with access to the secret gpg keys to do this.
Would that require the user to download all iso images?
Are these sums something we only expect more advanced users to care about?
I guess currently only more advanced users know the security risk that exists,
if they do not verify the iso images. I also guess that if less advanced
users know these, they would verify the iso images, too.
But our job is to get users the software bits, not to educate them on
everything that could possibly go wrong in their doing so, right?
~m
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