On Mi, 04.07.18 14:50, Mantas MikulÄ?nas (grawity at gmail.com) wrote: > (I think glibc's nscd should also not be forgotten, since it offloads *all* > modules into a single caching daemon. Would have protected against last > year's glibc libnss_dns CVE, I'm sure.) glibc's nscd is not really useful as security mechanism. glibc's client-side NSS code will only wait for a few 100ms for nscd before falling back to client side NSS lookups. This means to circumvent any sandboxing applied to nscd it's sufficient to somehow make lookups slow... nscd is purely and only useful for caching really, where such a fallback makes sense and might be an effective way to automatically recover from any potential deadlocks. Lennart -- Lennart Poettering, Red Hat