On Thu, 26 Jul 2018 09:32:07 -0700 Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 8:22 AM Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Thu, 26 Jul 2018 08:14:08 -0700 > > Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > Thank you Steve, much appreciated feedback, I have asked the security > > > developers to keep this in mind and come up with a correct fix. > > > > > > The correct fix that meets your guidelines would _not_ be suitable for > > > stable due to the invasiveness it sounds, only for the latest will such > > > a rework make sense. As such, the fix proposed in this patch is the only > > > one that meets the bar for stable patch simplicity, and merely(!) needs > > > to state that if the fix is taken, perf and trace are broken. > > > > > > Posting this patch publicly on the lists, that may never be applied, may > > > be the limit of our responsibility for a fix to stable kernel releases, > > > to be optionally applied by vendors concerned with this CVE criteria? > > > > > > > The patch breaks the code it touches. It makes it useless. > > Doesn't that depend on kptr_restrict, or would it be broken if > kptr_restrict was set to 0? Is that what governs the output of kallsyms? -- Steve
