On Thu, 26 Jul 2018 08:14:08 -0700 Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Thank you Steve, much appreciated feedback, I have asked the security > developers to keep this in mind and come up with a correct fix. > > The correct fix that meets your guidelines would _not_ be suitable for > stable due to the invasiveness it sounds, only for the latest will such > a rework make sense. As such, the fix proposed in this patch is the only > one that meets the bar for stable patch simplicity, and merely(!) needs > to state that if the fix is taken, perf and trace are broken. > > Posting this patch publicly on the lists, that may never be applied, may > be the limit of our responsibility for a fix to stable kernel releases, > to be optionally applied by vendors concerned with this CVE criteria? > The patch breaks the code it touches. It makes it useless. If you want something for stable, add a command line parameter that just disables the creation of that file. Otherwise you will break usespace and that will be a definitely NAK from Linus, and for stable itself. This is a very minor security issue, and does not justify breaking userspace applications. I would be very upset if a new stable release broke both perf and trace-cmd's ability to read certain trace events. -- Steve
