On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 8:22 AM Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Thu, 26 Jul 2018 08:14:08 -0700 > Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Thank you Steve, much appreciated feedback, I have asked the security > > developers to keep this in mind and come up with a correct fix. > > > > The correct fix that meets your guidelines would _not_ be suitable for > > stable due to the invasiveness it sounds, only for the latest will such > > a rework make sense. As such, the fix proposed in this patch is the only > > one that meets the bar for stable patch simplicity, and merely(!) needs > > to state that if the fix is taken, perf and trace are broken. > > > > Posting this patch publicly on the lists, that may never be applied, may > > be the limit of our responsibility for a fix to stable kernel releases, > > to be optionally applied by vendors concerned with this CVE criteria? > > > > The patch breaks the code it touches. It makes it useless. Doesn't that depend on kptr_restrict, or would it be broken if kptr_restrict was set to 0? > If you want > something for stable, add a command line parameter that just disables > the creation of that file. Otherwise you will break usespace and that > will be a definitely NAK from Linus, and for stable itself. This is a > very minor security issue, and does not justify breaking userspace > applications. I would be very upset if a new stable release broke both > perf and trace-cmd's ability to read certain trace events. I don't disagree. -- Thanks, ~Nick Desaulniers
