On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 12:35:36PM -0500, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
> > I agree with you that some help from the windowing/toolkit would be good
> > to have, but in this case, I doubt we are going to be able to do better
> > than managing this in spice-gtk.
>
> Yet it is already being solved at a lower level, where you can actually enforce that behaviour.
Yes, it is solved with wayland. The question I'm asking/the problem I'm
trying to solve is what do we do for existing systems using Xorg and
gtk+3. With Xorg being phased out (which will still take a few years),
and gtk+3 being phased out (again, will take at least a few years), I
don't see this kind of clipboard behaviour changes going into either of
these. Maybe I'm wrong, but assuming I'm not, then either we fix it
("it" being xorg + gtk3) in spice-gtk even though that's not the best
place, or we don't fix it at all.
If we decide to do something in spice-gtk, one option is to only send
the clipboard when the window is focused, which will reduce the attack
surface for everyone, and hopefully will have minimal impact.
Another option (which is not exclusive) is to add command-line/runtime
ways of enabling/disabling clipboard sharing, which you will either have
to know about it if it's enabled by default, or will be quite disruptive
if we disable clipboard sharing by default.
I'd lean towards doing "clipboard sharing for focused client" +
"command-line/runtime option, with clipboard sharing enabled by
default".
Christophe
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