Hi
----- Original Message -----
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 12:35:36PM -0500, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
> > > I agree with you that some help from the windowing/toolkit would be good
> > > to have, but in this case, I doubt we are going to be able to do better
> > > than managing this in spice-gtk.
> >
> > Yet it is already being solved at a lower level, where you can actually
> > enforce that behaviour.
>
> Yes, it is solved with wayland. The question I'm asking/the problem I'm
> trying to solve is what do we do for existing systems using Xorg and
> gtk+3. With Xorg being phased out (which will still take a few years),
> and gtk+3 being phased out (again, will take at least a few years), I
> don't see this kind of clipboard behaviour changes going into either of
> these. Maybe I'm wrong, but assuming I'm not, then either we fix it
> ("it" being xorg + gtk3) in spice-gtk even though that's not the best
> place, or we don't fix it at all.
>
> If we decide to do something in spice-gtk, one option is to only send
> the clipboard when the window is focused, which will reduce the attack
> surface for everyone, and hopefully will have minimal impact.
> Another option (which is not exclusive) is to add command-line/runtime
> ways of enabling/disabling clipboard sharing, which you will either have
> to know about it if it's enabled by default, or will be quite disruptive
> if we disable clipboard sharing by default.
Is it really a security reason the clipboard behaviour is different on Wayland? For me, this "share on focus" is not a more secure behaviour.
>
> I'd lean towards doing "clipboard sharing for focused client" +
> "command-line/runtime option, with clipboard sharing enabled by
> default".
I'd rather stick with a simple command-line & runtime option.
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