SELinux folks, Stephen: I have some thoughts about reimplementation of 'netstat -Z', but I do not know if it is valuable, or if there are other risks. Could you evaluate my implementation, or give me your valuable advice? 1. From kernel, print the socket labels to tcp, udp, raw, unix files under /proc/net/. Now the /proc/net/tcp /proc/net/udp ... include many socket's information, like local address, remote address, inode, I think we can put the socket's security context to these files. To avoid to expose these information to non-privileged users, security checking should be done when expose the socket security context to procfs. 2. reimplementation the "netstat -Z", "netstat -Z" will first parse the security context from procfs's tcp, udp, raw files, and get the security context, if this step fails, "netstat -Z" will try as legacy method. If this implementation could be accepted by mainstream, netstat could print the correct socket label even if the type_transition has been happen on socket, or application changes socket labels by setting /proc/self/attr/sockcreate. Do you think it is valuable? Thanks -- Best Reagrds, Roy | RongQing Li ------------------------------------------------------------- WIND RIVER Beijing | China Development Center Phone: +86-10-6483-5025, Cell: +86-135-2202-9864, Fax: +86-10-6479-0367 -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
