On 04/13/2011 02:07 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Wed, 2011-04-13 at 13:35 -0400, Steve Lawrence wrote:
>> On 04/13/2011 11:23 AM, Steve Lawrence wrote:
>>> Thanks for the patch. This solves the problem, but I'm still seeing
>>> issues that seems related to support of older version of policy when
>>> using role_transition with non-process classes. I'm now seeing an mls
>>> range overflow error:
>>>
>>> libsepol.role_trans_write: Discarding role_transition rules for security
>>> class other than "process"
>>> libsepol.mls_read_range_helper: range overflow
>>> libsepol.context_read_and_validate: error reading MLS range of context
>>> libsepol.policydb_to_image: new policy image is invalid
>>>
>>> I'm still looking into it, but I'm not too familiar this part of the code.
>>>
>>>
>>> On 04/12/2011 05:11 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
>>>> Although the role trans code had support to handle the kernel policy
>>>> when the version was less that roletrans such support was not in the
>>>> module read/write code. This patch adds proper support for role trans
>>>> in modules.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>> libsepol/src/policydb.c | 14 ++++++++++----
>>>> libsepol/src/write.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>>> 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/policydb.c b/libsepol/src/policydb.c
>>>> index 2ecb636..6d8ff91 100644
>>>> --- a/libsepol/src/policydb.c
>>>> +++ b/libsepol/src/policydb.c
>>>> @@ -3033,7 +3033,8 @@ int avrule_read_list(policydb_t * p, avrule_t ** avrules,
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> -static int role_trans_rule_read(role_trans_rule_t ** r, struct policy_file *fp)
>>>> +static int role_trans_rule_read(policydb_t *p, role_trans_rule_t ** r,
>>>> + struct policy_file *fp)
>>>> {
>>>> uint32_t buf[1], nel;
>>>> unsigned int i;
>>>> @@ -3064,8 +3065,13 @@ static int role_trans_rule_read(role_trans_rule_t ** r, struct policy_file *fp)
>>>> if (type_set_read(&tr->types, fp))
>>>> return -1;
>>>>
>>>> - if (ebitmap_read(&tr->classes, fp))
>>>> - return -1;
>>>> + if (p->policyvers >= MOD_POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
>>>> + if (ebitmap_read(&tr->classes, fp))
>>>> + return -1;
>>>> + } else {
>>>> + if (ebitmap_set_bit(&tr->classes, SECCLASS_PROCESS - 1, 1))
>>>> + return -1;
>>>> + }
>>>>
>>>> rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(uint32_t));
>>>> if (rc < 0)
>>>> @@ -3258,7 +3264,7 @@ static int avrule_decl_read(policydb_t * p, avrule_decl_t * decl,
>>>> decl->enabled = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
>>>> if (cond_read_list(p, &decl->cond_list, fp) == -1 ||
>>>> avrule_read_list(p, &decl->avrules, fp) == -1 ||
>>>> - role_trans_rule_read(&decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>>>> + role_trans_rule_read(p, &decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>>>> role_allow_rule_read(&decl->role_allow_rules, fp) == -1) {
>>>> return -1;
>>>> }
>>>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/write.c b/libsepol/src/write.c
>>>> index c4f5035..78b3aa6 100644
>>>> --- a/libsepol/src/write.c
>>>> +++ b/libsepol/src/write.c
>>>> @@ -1482,26 +1482,53 @@ static int avrule_write_list(avrule_t * avrules, struct policy_file *fp)
>>>> return POLICYDB_SUCCESS;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> -static int role_trans_rule_write(role_trans_rule_t * t, struct policy_file *fp)
>>>> +static int only_process(ebitmap_t *in)
>>>> +{
>>>> + unsigned int i;
>>>> + ebitmap_node_t *node;
>>>> +
>>>> + ebitmap_for_each_bit(in, node, i) {
>>>> + if (ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i) &&
>>>> + i != SECCLASS_PROCESS - 1)
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> + }
>>>> + return 1;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int role_trans_rule_write(policydb_t *p, role_trans_rule_t * t,
>>>> + struct policy_file *fp)
>>>> {
>>>> int nel = 0;
>>>> size_t items;
>>>> uint32_t buf[1];
>>>> role_trans_rule_t *tr;
>>>> + int warned = 0;
>>>> + int new_role = p->policyvers >= MOD_POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS;
>>>>
>>>> for (tr = t; tr; tr = tr->next)
>>>> - nel++;
>>>> + if (new_role || only_process(&tr->classes))
>>>> + nel++;
>>>> +
>>>> buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
>>>> items = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
>>>> if (items != 1)
>>>> return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>>> for (tr = t; tr; tr = tr->next) {
>>>> + if (!new_role && !only_process(&tr->classes)) {
>>>> + if (!warned)
>>>> + WARN(fp->handle, "Discarding role_transition "
>>>> + "rules for security classes other than "
>>>> + "\"process\"");
>>>> + warned = 1;
>>>> + continue;
>>>> + }
>>>> if (role_set_write(&tr->roles, fp))
>>>> return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>>> if (type_set_write(&tr->types, fp))
>>>> return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>>> - if (ebitmap_write(&tr->classes, fp))
>>>> - return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>>> + if (new_role)
>>>> + if (ebitmap_write(&tr->classes, fp))
>>>> + return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>>> buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->new_role);
>>>> items = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
>>>> if (items != 1)
>>>> @@ -1636,7 +1663,7 @@ static int avrule_decl_write(avrule_decl_t * decl, int num_scope_syms,
>>>> }
>>>> if (cond_write_list(p, decl->cond_list, fp) == -1 ||
>>>> avrule_write_list(decl->avrules, fp) == -1 ||
>>>> - role_trans_rule_write(decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>>>> + role_trans_rule_write(p, decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>>>> role_allow_rule_write(decl->role_allow_rules, fp) == -1) {
>>>> return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>>> }
>>>
>>>
>>> --
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>>
>> I think the below patch fixes the problem I was seeing. Some rules were
>> getting discarded in role_trans_write during a policy downgrade, but the
>> count was not being decreased. This fix is similar to your fix in
>> role_trans_rule_write.
>
> Looks as appropriate to me as when range trans does it.
>
> -Eric
>
>> ---
>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/write.c b/libsepol/src/write.c
>> index 78b3aa6..3a9c35a 100644
>> --- a/libsepol/src/write.c
>> +++ b/libsepol/src/write.c
>> @@ -474,7 +474,9 @@ static int role_trans_write(policydb_t *p, struct
>> policy_file *fp)
>>
>> nel = 0;
>> for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next)
>> - nel++;
>> + if(new_roletr || tr->class == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
>> + nel++;
>> +
>> buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
>> items = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
>> if (items != 1)
>
>
Both patches applied in libsepol-2.0.44.
Thanks.
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