Re: [PATCH] libsepol: support policy modules when roletrans rules not supported

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On 04/13/2011 11:23 AM, Steve Lawrence wrote:
> Thanks for the patch. This solves the problem, but I'm still seeing
> issues that seems related to support of older version of policy when
> using role_transition with non-process classes. I'm now seeing an mls
> range overflow error:
> 
> libsepol.role_trans_write: Discarding role_transition rules for security
> class other than "process"
> libsepol.mls_read_range_helper: range overflow
> libsepol.context_read_and_validate: error reading MLS range of context
> libsepol.policydb_to_image: new policy image is invalid
> 
> I'm still looking into it, but I'm not too familiar this part of the code.
> 
> 
> On 04/12/2011 05:11 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
>> Although the role trans code had support to handle the kernel policy
>> when the version was less that roletrans such support was not in the
>> module read/write code.  This patch adds proper support for role trans
>> in modules.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>>  libsepol/src/policydb.c |   14 ++++++++++----
>>  libsepol/src/write.c    |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>  2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/policydb.c b/libsepol/src/policydb.c
>> index 2ecb636..6d8ff91 100644
>> --- a/libsepol/src/policydb.c
>> +++ b/libsepol/src/policydb.c
>> @@ -3033,7 +3033,8 @@ int avrule_read_list(policydb_t * p, avrule_t ** avrules,
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>>  
>> -static int role_trans_rule_read(role_trans_rule_t ** r, struct policy_file *fp)
>> +static int role_trans_rule_read(policydb_t *p, role_trans_rule_t ** r,
>> +				struct policy_file *fp)
>>  {
>>  	uint32_t buf[1], nel;
>>  	unsigned int i;
>> @@ -3064,8 +3065,13 @@ static int role_trans_rule_read(role_trans_rule_t ** r, struct policy_file *fp)
>>  		if (type_set_read(&tr->types, fp))
>>  			return -1;
>>  
>> -		if (ebitmap_read(&tr->classes, fp))
>> -			return -1;
>> +		if (p->policyvers >= MOD_POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
>> +			if (ebitmap_read(&tr->classes, fp))
>> +				return -1;
>> +		} else {
>> +			if (ebitmap_set_bit(&tr->classes, SECCLASS_PROCESS - 1, 1))
>> +				return -1;
>> +		}
>>  
>>  		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(uint32_t));
>>  		if (rc < 0)
>> @@ -3258,7 +3264,7 @@ static int avrule_decl_read(policydb_t * p, avrule_decl_t * decl,
>>  	decl->enabled = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
>>  	if (cond_read_list(p, &decl->cond_list, fp) == -1 ||
>>  	    avrule_read_list(p, &decl->avrules, fp) == -1 ||
>> -	    role_trans_rule_read(&decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>> +	    role_trans_rule_read(p, &decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>>  	    role_allow_rule_read(&decl->role_allow_rules, fp) == -1) {
>>  		return -1;
>>  	}
>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/write.c b/libsepol/src/write.c
>> index c4f5035..78b3aa6 100644
>> --- a/libsepol/src/write.c
>> +++ b/libsepol/src/write.c
>> @@ -1482,26 +1482,53 @@ static int avrule_write_list(avrule_t * avrules, struct policy_file *fp)
>>  	return POLICYDB_SUCCESS;
>>  }
>>  
>> -static int role_trans_rule_write(role_trans_rule_t * t, struct policy_file *fp)
>> +static int only_process(ebitmap_t *in)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned int i;
>> +	ebitmap_node_t *node;
>> +
>> +	ebitmap_for_each_bit(in, node, i) {
>> +		if (ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i) &&
>> +		    i != SECCLASS_PROCESS - 1)
>> +			return 0;
>> +	}
>> +	return 1;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int role_trans_rule_write(policydb_t *p, role_trans_rule_t * t,
>> +				 struct policy_file *fp)
>>  {
>>  	int nel = 0;
>>  	size_t items;
>>  	uint32_t buf[1];
>>  	role_trans_rule_t *tr;
>> +	int warned = 0;
>> +	int new_role = p->policyvers >= MOD_POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS;
>>  
>>  	for (tr = t; tr; tr = tr->next)
>> -		nel++;
>> +		if (new_role || only_process(&tr->classes))
>> +			nel++;
>> +
>>  	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
>>  	items = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
>>  	if (items != 1)
>>  		return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>  	for (tr = t; tr; tr = tr->next) {
>> +		if (!new_role && !only_process(&tr->classes)) {
>> +			if (!warned)
>> +				WARN(fp->handle, "Discarding role_transition "
>> +					"rules for security classes other than "
>> +					"\"process\"");
>> +			warned = 1;
>> +			continue;
>> +		}
>>  		if (role_set_write(&tr->roles, fp))
>>  			return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>  		if (type_set_write(&tr->types, fp))
>>  			return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>> -		if (ebitmap_write(&tr->classes, fp))
>> -			return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>> +		if (new_role)
>> +			if (ebitmap_write(&tr->classes, fp))
>> +				return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>  		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->new_role);
>>  		items = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
>>  		if (items != 1)
>> @@ -1636,7 +1663,7 @@ static int avrule_decl_write(avrule_decl_t * decl, int num_scope_syms,
>>  	}
>>  	if (cond_write_list(p, decl->cond_list, fp) == -1 ||
>>  	    avrule_write_list(decl->avrules, fp) == -1 ||
>> -	    role_trans_rule_write(decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>> +	    role_trans_rule_write(p, decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>>  	    role_allow_rule_write(decl->role_allow_rules, fp) == -1) {
>>  		return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>>  	}
> 
> 
> --
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I think the below patch fixes the problem I was seeing. Some rules were
getting discarded in role_trans_write during a policy downgrade, but the
count was not being decreased. This fix is similar to your fix in
role_trans_rule_write.

---
diff --git a/libsepol/src/write.c b/libsepol/src/write.c
index 78b3aa6..3a9c35a 100644
--- a/libsepol/src/write.c
+++ b/libsepol/src/write.c
@@ -474,7 +474,9 @@ static int role_trans_write(policydb_t *p, struct
policy_file *fp)

    nel = 0;
    for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next)
-       nel++;
+       if(new_roletr || tr->class == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
+           nel++;
+
    buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
    items = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
    if (items != 1)

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