Re: [PATCH] libsepol: support policy modules when roletrans rules not supported

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Thanks for the patch. This solves the problem, but I'm still seeing
issues that seems related to support of older version of policy when
using role_transition with non-process classes. I'm now seeing an mls
range overflow error:

libsepol.role_trans_write: Discarding role_transition rules for security
class other than "process"
libsepol.mls_read_range_helper: range overflow
libsepol.context_read_and_validate: error reading MLS range of context
libsepol.policydb_to_image: new policy image is invalid

I'm still looking into it, but I'm not too familiar this part of the code.


On 04/12/2011 05:11 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
> Although the role trans code had support to handle the kernel policy
> when the version was less that roletrans such support was not in the
> module read/write code.  This patch adds proper support for role trans
> in modules.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  libsepol/src/policydb.c |   14 ++++++++++----
>  libsepol/src/write.c    |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/libsepol/src/policydb.c b/libsepol/src/policydb.c
> index 2ecb636..6d8ff91 100644
> --- a/libsepol/src/policydb.c
> +++ b/libsepol/src/policydb.c
> @@ -3033,7 +3033,8 @@ int avrule_read_list(policydb_t * p, avrule_t ** avrules,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static int role_trans_rule_read(role_trans_rule_t ** r, struct policy_file *fp)
> +static int role_trans_rule_read(policydb_t *p, role_trans_rule_t ** r,
> +				struct policy_file *fp)
>  {
>  	uint32_t buf[1], nel;
>  	unsigned int i;
> @@ -3064,8 +3065,13 @@ static int role_trans_rule_read(role_trans_rule_t ** r, struct policy_file *fp)
>  		if (type_set_read(&tr->types, fp))
>  			return -1;
>  
> -		if (ebitmap_read(&tr->classes, fp))
> -			return -1;
> +		if (p->policyvers >= MOD_POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
> +			if (ebitmap_read(&tr->classes, fp))
> +				return -1;
> +		} else {
> +			if (ebitmap_set_bit(&tr->classes, SECCLASS_PROCESS - 1, 1))
> +				return -1;
> +		}
>  
>  		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(uint32_t));
>  		if (rc < 0)
> @@ -3258,7 +3264,7 @@ static int avrule_decl_read(policydb_t * p, avrule_decl_t * decl,
>  	decl->enabled = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
>  	if (cond_read_list(p, &decl->cond_list, fp) == -1 ||
>  	    avrule_read_list(p, &decl->avrules, fp) == -1 ||
> -	    role_trans_rule_read(&decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
> +	    role_trans_rule_read(p, &decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>  	    role_allow_rule_read(&decl->role_allow_rules, fp) == -1) {
>  		return -1;
>  	}
> diff --git a/libsepol/src/write.c b/libsepol/src/write.c
> index c4f5035..78b3aa6 100644
> --- a/libsepol/src/write.c
> +++ b/libsepol/src/write.c
> @@ -1482,26 +1482,53 @@ static int avrule_write_list(avrule_t * avrules, struct policy_file *fp)
>  	return POLICYDB_SUCCESS;
>  }
>  
> -static int role_trans_rule_write(role_trans_rule_t * t, struct policy_file *fp)
> +static int only_process(ebitmap_t *in)
> +{
> +	unsigned int i;
> +	ebitmap_node_t *node;
> +
> +	ebitmap_for_each_bit(in, node, i) {
> +		if (ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i) &&
> +		    i != SECCLASS_PROCESS - 1)
> +			return 0;
> +	}
> +	return 1;
> +}
> +
> +static int role_trans_rule_write(policydb_t *p, role_trans_rule_t * t,
> +				 struct policy_file *fp)
>  {
>  	int nel = 0;
>  	size_t items;
>  	uint32_t buf[1];
>  	role_trans_rule_t *tr;
> +	int warned = 0;
> +	int new_role = p->policyvers >= MOD_POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS;
>  
>  	for (tr = t; tr; tr = tr->next)
> -		nel++;
> +		if (new_role || only_process(&tr->classes))
> +			nel++;
> +
>  	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
>  	items = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
>  	if (items != 1)
>  		return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>  	for (tr = t; tr; tr = tr->next) {
> +		if (!new_role && !only_process(&tr->classes)) {
> +			if (!warned)
> +				WARN(fp->handle, "Discarding role_transition "
> +					"rules for security classes other than "
> +					"\"process\"");
> +			warned = 1;
> +			continue;
> +		}
>  		if (role_set_write(&tr->roles, fp))
>  			return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>  		if (type_set_write(&tr->types, fp))
>  			return POLICYDB_ERROR;
> -		if (ebitmap_write(&tr->classes, fp))
> -			return POLICYDB_ERROR;
> +		if (new_role)
> +			if (ebitmap_write(&tr->classes, fp))
> +				return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>  		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->new_role);
>  		items = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
>  		if (items != 1)
> @@ -1636,7 +1663,7 @@ static int avrule_decl_write(avrule_decl_t * decl, int num_scope_syms,
>  	}
>  	if (cond_write_list(p, decl->cond_list, fp) == -1 ||
>  	    avrule_write_list(decl->avrules, fp) == -1 ||
> -	    role_trans_rule_write(decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
> +	    role_trans_rule_write(p, decl->role_tr_rules, fp) == -1 ||
>  	    role_allow_rule_write(decl->role_allow_rules, fp) == -1) {
>  		return POLICYDB_ERROR;
>  	}


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