Re: odd policy behavior

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On Wed, 2009-02-04 at 11:12 -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
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> Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Tue, 2009-02-03 at 16:31 -0600, Xavier Toth wrote:
> >> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:49 PM, Xavier Toth <txtoth@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:28 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>> On Tue, 2009-02-03 at 13:59 -0600, Xavier Toth wrote:
> >>>>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 10:38 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>>>> On Tue, 2009-02-03 at 10:28 -0600, Xavier Toth wrote:
> >>>>>>> I have an app that wasn't working in enforcing but there are no AVCs.
> >>>>>>> So I did 'semodule -DB' to see if there were any dontaudit denials and
> >>>>>>> restarted the app. The problem is that the app then ran fine. So I
> >>>>>>> tried load_policy which had no affect and 'semodule -B' which makes it
> >>>>>>> work. Any ideas what could be happening? I've verified with 'semodule
> >>>>>>> --list' that the module is loaded prior to doing the 'semodule -B'.
> >>>>>> - How was the app failing?
> >>>>> This is our security banner app that draw a window across the top of
> >>>>> the screen with the users MLS range and with the appropriate
> >>>>> background color. When it fails there is just a window with a gray
> >>>>> background no text or color.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> - Did you try running the app in permissive as well?
> >>>>>> - Is this reproducible at all or are you unable to reproduce the
> >>>>>> application failure now under any conditions?
> >>>>>> - Did the app create/use any transient resources (temporary files,
> >>>>>> system v ipc objects, etc) that could have prevented it from succeeding
> >>>>>> on subsequent execution if they weren't properly cleaned up on prior
> >>>>>> exit?
> >>>>> After further investigation I found that a call to getseuserbyname for
> >>>>> the login user is returning the user name passed in and nothing for
> >>>>> the range which would be used in the banner. During our installation
> >>>>> we don't explicitly map this user to a SELinux user but our experience
> >>>>> has been that the when there is no mapping the user and range of the
> >>>>> '__default__' login are returned. Indeed once I rebuild policy this
> >>>>> appears to be what is happening. How rebuilding and reloading policy
> >>>>> would affect this is unclear.
> >>>> If the installed seusers file (i.e. /etc/selinux/$SELINUXTYPE/seusers)
> >>>> did not exist originally or was unreadable (e.g. wrong context or mode),
> >>>> then getseuserbyname() would behave the way you described.  Rebuilding
> >>>> policy would have caused the regenerated seusers file to be installed,
> >>>> possibly with different context or mode than the original state.
> >>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>> Stephen Smalley
> >>>> National Security Agency
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> You nailed it for some reason seusers is SystemHigh. Still
> >>> investigating ... Thanks
> >>>
> >>> Ted
> >>>
> >> The plot thickens. semodule -B causes seusers to be relabeled
> >> SystemLow. restorecon /etc/selinux/mls/seusers causes the file to be
> >> relabeled SystemHigh. Which is right?
> > 
> > I don't think that semodule/libsemanage explicitly set the context of
> > files they create, so they would just follow the default policy behavior
> > (in this case, inheriting the level of the creating process and the type
> > of the parent directory).
> > 
> > restorecon just applies whatever the file_contexts configuration
> > specifies, which appears to be SystemHigh in the mls policy.  I'm not
> > sure if that is truly justified.
> > 
> Since all the login programs have to read this file it should be at the
> SystemLow, So that a login program running at a SystemLow can work.

Makes sense to me, but I assume that someone thought otherwise or it
wouldn't have been marked as SystemHigh in the first place?  Does the
LSPP impose a particular restriction on it?  There are
other /etc/selinux files in file_contexts as well that are marked with
SystemHigh (or to be precise, s15:c0.c1023) in the -mls policy.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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