Re: SELinux policy and performance impacts

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On Thursday 07 August 2008 8:03:02 pm James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 7 Aug 2008, Matt Anderson wrote:
> > I'm currently looking into the performance impact of SELinux.  Most
> > of what I have seen so far involve testing the system's performance
> > with file creation, open, and exec, but I was hoping to gather some
> > more data before finalizing any conclusions.
> >
> > I was wondering if anyone knows of any types of policy rules that
> > when loaded into the kernel are particularly detrimental to system
> > performance.  My understanding is that all policy rules are treated
> > equally once they've been compiled to binary, but I wanted to ask
> > here first in order to confirm that.
>
> Yes, all access rules are applied in a standard form with decisions
> cached in the AVC.  There were some network permissions which had to
> do a full policydb lookup on each packet to determine the label to
> use, but these are also now cached (although will still incur some
> overhead).

As an FYI, you'll want 2.6.26 to get the all of the cached network 
permissions; 2.6.25 added interface and node caches, 2.6.26 added port 
caches.  If you are looking at network performance as part of this you 
will want to make sure compat_net is disabled, i.e. use Secmark.  

Ideally you would also enable the new network_peer_controls policy 
capability but I don't think we have that enabled by default just yet, 
needs more testing I believe.

-- 
paul moore
linux @ hp

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