Re: Network flow controls and subj/obj ordering

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On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 14:36 -0500, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 14:30 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 14:25 -0500, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> > > On Thu, 2007-12-13 at 10:45 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > On Thursday 13 December 2007 9:12:08 am Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, 2007-12-12 at 15:18 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > > > Assuming labeled networking is enabled, a forwarded packet would
> > > > > > hit four checks:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >  # inbound checks
> > > > > >  allow netif_t peer_t:peer ingress;
> > > > > >  allow netnode_t peer_t:peer ingress;
> > > > > >  # outbound checks
> > > > > >  allow netif_t peer_t:peer egress;
> > > > > >  allow netnode_t peer_t:peer egress;
> > > > >
> > > > > This helps.  But this seems to be for the old networking, how does it
> > > > > work with the secmark stuff?
> > > > 
> > > > It doesn't work with the SECMARK stuff, or rather it works in parallel 
> > > > with the SECMARK stuff.  We've debated integrating the peer labeling 
> > > > protocols (labeled IPsec, NetLabel) with the SECMARK mechanism many 
> > > > times but in the end we always end up deciding it doesn't make sense.
> > > 
> > > So, with compat_net off, you'd still need the above policy, not the
> > > packet type against the peer type?, e.g., not this:
> > > 
> > > allow ssh_client_packet_t peer_t:peer egress;
> > 
> > Correct, not that.  secmark remains a separate and orthogonal mechanism,
> > with permission checks against the packet class (not the peer class),
> > and the secmark label is only ever used for its checks.
> 
> The thing that confuses me is that I thought secmark was supposed to
> replace netif/node for IP traffic.  So using the node/netif labels just
> seems wrong to me.

secmark can replace the legacy netif/node checks.  It doesn't provide
the desired functionality for labeled networking.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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