On Thu, 10 Aug 2023 at 20:44, Peter Stuge <peter@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > Philipp Marek wrote: > > An easy workaround is to use a password manager (a plain file as a minimum) > > If you can/want to use a file then consider using a key instead. > > publickey authentication is non-interactive on the wire and the key is > already unlocked so packet timing leaks nothing about your passphrase. Just to be clear: SSH's password authentication is not subject to this attack. The client sends the whole password in a single SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packet (see RFC4252 section 8) so there's no inter-keystroke timing. Same goes for keyboard-interactive (RFC4256). The issue is that if during an interactive session you invoke something that wants a password which it reads from the tty (eg su, sudo, ssh-add or a second ssh invocation) that the potential exists to leak keystroke timing. If you needed to do a two-hop ssh then using either of pubkey via agent forwarding or jumphost would avoid the timing leaving the client machine. -- Darren Tucker (dtucker at dtucker.net) GPG key 11EAA6FA / A86E 3E07 5B19 5880 E860 37F4 9357 ECEF 11EA A6FA Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience usually comes from bad judgement. _______________________________________________ openssh-unix-dev mailing list openssh-unix-dev@xxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev