If you trust that nothing on the box is or ever will connect that youjust remember to allow incoming ICMP. Please? ICMP _is_ an integral part of IP, and shouldn't be blocked out!
don't want to, then output chain can just have an ACCEPT policy. If you
want to lock down to make it harder for a trojan or such to communicate
back from the box, you can set a DROP policy, then:
iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
You can do
iptables -I INPUT -p icmp -j REJECT --reject-with echo-reply
to answer all pings to hosts behind with echo reply (just fake it) in case you're afraid of anyone scanning you.
you might add a -limit as well to prevent them DoSing you (man iptables)
roy
will let traffic back out in response to client requests, but not let the
box initiate any connections. If this tighter firewall still allows the
needed connections, why open up any further? I'd suggest you might want
to log dropped output traffic, though, to see what DOES try to get out.
Depending on your usage and plans, you might want to open a few
outbounds, like traceroute, ping, CVS, http, or ftp access FROM the box
if you want to use these services when logged into the box, for updating
software etc. Of course you can just allow those connections when
needed, and the rest of the time go with DROP policy and the EST/REL
rule above.
j