On Fri, Dec 18, 2020 at 1:47 AM Michael Labriola
<michael.d.labriola@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Dec 17, 2020 at 4:56 PM Michael Labriola
> <michael.d.labriola@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Dec 17, 2020 at 3:25 PM Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, Dec 17, 2020 at 9:46 PM Michael Labriola
> > > <michael.d.labriola@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Dec 17, 2020 at 1:07 PM Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Dec 17, 2020 at 6:22 PM Michael Labriola
> > > > *snip*
> > > > > > On Thu, Dec 17, 2020 at 7:00 AM Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > > Thanks, Amir. I didn't have CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG enabled, so
> > > > >
> > > > > I honestly don't expect to find much in the existing overlay debug prints
> > > > > but you never know..
> > > > > I suspect you will have to add debug prints to find the problem.
> > > >
> > > > Ok, here goes. I had to setup a new virtual machine that doesn't use
> > > > overlayfs for its root filesystem because turning on dynamic debug
> > > > gave way too much output for a nice controlled test. It's exhibiting
> > > > the same behavior as my previous tests (5.8 good, 5.9 bad). The is
> > > > with a freshly compiled 5.9.15 w/ CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_XINO_AUTO turned
> > > > off and CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG turned on. Here's what we get:
> > > >
> > > > echo "file fs/overlayfs/* +p" > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control
> > > > mount borky2.sqsh t
> > > > mount -t tmpfs tmp tt
> > > > mkdir -p tt/upper/{upper,work}
> > > > mount -t overlay -o \
> > > > lowerdir=t,upperdir=tt/upper/upper,workdir=tt/upper/work blarg ttt
> > > > [ 164.505193] overlayfs: mkdir(work/work, 040000) = 0
> > > > [ 164.505204] overlayfs: tmpfile(work/work, 0100000) = 0
> > > > [ 164.505209] overlayfs: create(work/#3, 0100000) = 0
> > > > [ 164.505210] overlayfs: rename(work/#3, work/#4, 0x4)
> > > > [ 164.505216] overlayfs: unlink(work/#3) = 0
> > > > [ 164.505217] overlayfs: unlink(work/#4) = 0
> > > > [ 164.505221] overlayfs: setxattr(work/work,
> > > > "trusted.overlay.opaque", "0", 1, 0x0) = 0
> > > >
> > > > touch ttt/FOO
> > > > touch: cannot touch 'ttt/FOO': No data available
> > > > [ 191.919498] overlayfs: setxattr(upper/upper,
> > > > "trusted.overlay.impure", "y", 1, 0x0) = 0
> > > > [ 191.919523] overlayfs: tmpfile(work/work, 0100644) = 0
> > > > [ 191.919788] overlayfs: tmpfile(work/work, 0100644) = 0
> > > >
> > > > That give you any hints? I'll start reading through the overlayfs
> > > > code. I've never actually looked at it, so I'll be planting printk
> > > > calls at random. ;-)
> > >
> > > We have seen that open("FOO", O_WRONLY) fails
> > > We know that FOO is lower at that time so that brings us to
> > >
> > > ovl_open
> > > ovl_maybe_copy_up
> > > ovl_copy_up_flags
> > > ovl_copy_up_one
> > > ovl_do_copy_up
> > > ovl_set_impure
> > > [ 191.919498] overlayfs: setxattr(upper/upper,
> > > "trusted.overlay.impure", "y", 1, 0x0) = 0
> > > ovl_copy_up_tmpfile
> > > ovl_do_tmpfile
> > > [ 191.919523] overlayfs: tmpfile(work/work, 0100644) = 0
> > > ovl_copy_up_inode
> > > This must be were we fail and likely in:
> > > ovl_copy_xattr
> > > vfs_getxattr
> > > which can return -ENODATA, but it is not expected because the
> > > xattrs returned by vfs_listxattr should exist...
> > >
> > > So first guess would be to add a debug print for xattr 'name'
> > > and return value of vfs_getxattr().
> >
> > Ok, here we go. I've added a bunch of printks all over the place.
> > Here's what we've got. Things are unchanged during mount. Trying to
> > touch FOO now gives me this:
> >
> > [ 114.365444] ovl_open: start
> > [ 114.365450] ovl_maybe_copy_up: start
> > [ 114.365452] ovl_maybe_copy_up: need copy up
> > [ 114.365454] ovl_maybe_copy_up: ovl_want_write succeeded
> > [ 114.365459] ovl_copy_up_one: calling ovl_do_copy_up()
> > [ 114.365460] ovl_do_copy_up: start
> > [ 114.365462] ovl_do_copy_up: impure
> > [ 114.365464] ovl_set_impure: start
> > [ 114.365484] overlayfs: setxattr(upper/upper,
> > "trusted.overlay.impure", "y", 1, 0x0) = 0
> > [ 114.365486] ovl_copy_up_tmpfile: start
> > [ 114.365507] overlayfs: tmpfile(work/work, 0100644) = 0
> > [ 114.365510] ovl_copy_up_inode: start
> > [ 114.365511] ovl_copy_up_inode: ISREG && !metacopy
> > [ 114.365625] ovl_copy_xattr: start
> > [ 114.365630] ovl_copy_xattr: vfs_listxattr() returned 17
> > [ 114.365632] ovl_copy_xattr: buf allocated good
> > [ 114.365634] ovl_copy_xattr: vfs_listxattr() returned 17
> > [ 114.365636] ovl_copy_xattr: slen=17
> > [ 114.365638] ovl_copy_xattr: name='security.selinux'
>
> SELinux? now that's not suspicious at all...
>
> > [ 114.365643] ovl_copy_xattr: vfs_getxattr returned size=-61
> > [ 114.365644] ovl_copy_xattr: cleaning up
> > [ 114.365647] ovl_copy_up_inode: ovl_copy_xattr error=-61
> > [ 114.365649] ovl_copy_up_one: error=-61
> > [ 114.365651] ovl_copy_up_one: calling ovl_copy_up_end()
> > [ 114.365653] ovl_copy_up_flags: ovl_copy_up_one error=-61
> > [ 114.365655] ovl_maybe_copy_up: ovl_copy_up_flags error=-61
> > [ 114.365658] ovl_open: ovl_maybe_copy_up error=-61
> > [ 114.365728] ovl_copy_up_one: calling ovl_do_copy_up()
> > [ 114.365730] ovl_do_copy_up: start
> > [ 114.365731] ovl_do_copy_up: impure
> > [ 114.365733] ovl_set_impure: start
> > [ 114.365735] ovl_copy_up_tmpfile: start
> > [ 114.365748] overlayfs: tmpfile(work/work, 0100644) = 0
> > [ 114.365750] ovl_copy_up_inode: start
> > [ 114.365752] ovl_copy_up_inode: ISREG && !metacopy
> > [ 114.365770] ovl_copy_xattr: start
> > [ 114.365773] ovl_copy_xattr: vfs_listxattr() returned 17
> > [ 114.365774] ovl_copy_xattr: buf allocated good
> > [ 114.365776] ovl_copy_xattr: vfs_listxattr() returned 17
> > [ 114.365778] ovl_copy_xattr: slen=17
> > [ 114.365780] ovl_copy_xattr: name='security.selinux'
> > [ 114.365784] ovl_copy_xattr: vfs_getxattr returned size=-61
> > [ 114.365785] ovl_copy_xattr: cleaning up
> > [ 114.365787] ovl_copy_up_inode: ovl_copy_xattr error=-61
> > [ 114.365789] ovl_copy_up_one: error=-61
> > [ 114.365790] ovl_copy_up_one: calling ovl_copy_up_end()
> > [ 114.365792] ovl_copy_up_flags: ovl_copy_up_one error=-61
> >
> *snip*
>
> So, the selinux stuff made me raise an eyebrow... I've got selinux
> enabled in my kernel so that it's there if I boot up a RHEL box with
> this kernel. But I'm using Ubuntu right now, and the rest of SELinux
> is not installed/enabled. There shouldn't be any selinux labels in
> the files I slurped up into my squashfs image, so there shouldn't be
> any in the squashfs, so of course that won't work.
>
> I tried compiling CONFIG_SELINUX=n and guess what, it works now. So
> that's at least a work-around for me.
>
> So, for whatever reason, between 5.8 and 5.9, having CONFIG_SELINUX=y
> but no security labels on the filesystem became a problem? Is this
> something that needs to get fixed in overlayfs? Or do you think it's
> a deeper problem that needs fixing elsewhere?
>
It's both :)
Attached two patches that should each fix the issue independently,
but we need to apply both. I only tested that they build.
Please verify that each applied individually solves the problem.
The selinux- patch fixes an selinux regression introduced in kernel v5.9
the regression is manifested in your test case but goes beyond overlayfs.
The ovl- patch is a workaround for the selinux regression, but it is also
a micro optimization that doesn't hurt, so worth applying it anyway.
Thanks,
Amir.
From 7bb54c1ce106de26a1f52bd90dc3464ff1fb4269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 07:41:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: fix inconsistency between inode_getxattr and
inode_listsecurity
When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr
calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will
intercept in inode_getxattr hooks.
When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the
security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it
in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an
xattr returned by listxattr.
This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower
files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized,
because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by
vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr().
Match the logic of inode_listsecurity to that of inode_getxattr and
do not list the security.selinux xattr if selinux is not initialized.
Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@xxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: c8e222616c7e ("selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx#v5.9+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6b1826fc3658..e132e082a5af 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3406,6 +3406,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
+ return 0;
+
if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
return len;
--
2.25.1
From f31097914fc493373c3bc2c344a70e9057911442 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 07:41:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ovl: skip getxattr of security labels
When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr
calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will
intercept in inode_getxattr hooks.
When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the
security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it
in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an
xattr returned by listxattr.
This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower
files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized,
because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by
vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr().
ovl_copy_xattr() skips copy up of security labels that are indentified by
inode_copy_up_xattr LSM hooks, but it does that after vfs_getxattr().
Since we are not going to copy them, skip vfs_getxattr() of the security
labels.
Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@xxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: c8e222616c7e ("selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx#v5.9+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index e5b616c93e11..0fed532efa68 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -84,6 +84,14 @@ int ovl_copy_xattr(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *old,
if (ovl_is_private_xattr(sb, name))
continue;
+
+ error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+ if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ break;
+ if (error == 1) {
+ error = 0;
+ continue; /* Discard */
+ }
retry:
size = vfs_getxattr(old, name, value, value_size);
if (size == -ERANGE)
@@ -107,13 +115,6 @@ int ovl_copy_xattr(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *old,
goto retry;
}
- error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
- if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP)
- break;
- if (error == 1) {
- error = 0;
- continue; /* Discard */
- }
error = vfs_setxattr(new, name, value, size, 0);
if (error) {
if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP || ovl_must_copy_xattr(name))
--
2.25.1
