On 21. 01. 21, 10:00, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
The tty line discipline .read() function was passed the final user
pointer destination as an argument, which doesn't match the 'write()'
function, and makes it very inconvenient to do a splice method for
ttys.
This is a conversion to use a kernel buffer instead.
NOTE! It does this by passing the tty line discipline ->read() function
an additional "cookie" to fill in, and an offset into the cookie data.
The line discipline can fill in the cookie data with its own private
information, and then the reader will repeat the read until either the
cookie is cleared or it runs out of data.
The only real user of this is N_HDLC, which can use this to handle big
packets, even if the kernel buffer is smaller than the whole packet.
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
...
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -833,6 +833,65 @@ static void tty_update_time(struct timespec64 *time)
time->tv_sec = sec;
}
+/*
+ * Iterate on the ldisc ->read() function until we've gotten all
+ * the data the ldisc has for us.
+ *
+ * The "cookie" is something that the ldisc read function can fill
+ * in to let us know that there is more data to be had.
+ *
+ * We promise to continue to call the ldisc until it stops returning
+ * data or clears the cookie. The cookie may be something that the
+ * ldisc maintains state for and needs to free.
+ */
+static int iterate_tty_read(struct tty_ldisc *ld, struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
+ char __user *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ int retval = 0;
+ void *cookie = NULL;
+ unsigned long offset = 0;
+ char kernel_buf[64];
+
+ do {
+ int size, uncopied;
+
+ size = count > sizeof(kernel_buf) ? sizeof(kernel_buf) : count;
Or simply
size = min(count, sizeof(kernel_buf));
+ size = ld->ops->read(tty, file, kernel_buf, size, &cookie, offset);
+ if (!size)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * A ldisc read error return will override any previously copied
+ * data (eg -EOVERFLOW from HDLC)
+ */
+ if (size < 0) {
+ memzero_explicit(kernel_buf, sizeof(kernel_buf));
+ return size;
+ }
+
+ uncopied = copy_to_user(buf+offset, kernel_buf, size);
+ size -= uncopied;
+ offset += size;
+ count -= size;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user copy failed, we still need to do another ->read()
+ * call if we had a cookie to let the ldisc clear up.
+ *
+ * But make sure size is zeroed.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(uncopied)) {
+ count = 0;
+ retval = -EFAULT;
n_hdlc_tty_read will return EOVERFLOW when size is 0, so this EFAULT is
never propagated, if I am looking correctly? n_tty seems to be fine
(returns zero for zeroed size).
+ }
+ } while (cookie);
+
+ /* We always clear tty buffer in case they contained passwords */
+ memzero_explicit(kernel_buf, sizeof(kernel_buf));
+ return offset ? offset : retval;
+}
thanks,
--
js
