> On 18 Jan 2017, at 07:01, Xin Long <lucien.xin@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 12:38 AM, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner > <marcelo.leitner@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 02:07:52PM +0100, Julian Cordes wrote: >>> When a FORWARD-TSN-Chunk with a relative high cum-tsn-value is injected >>> then the linux kernel ignores this valid FORWARD-TSN-Chunk. >>> It should instead send an SACK-Chunk where the cum_tsn is equal to the >>> cum_tsn specified in the FORWARD-TSN. >> >> You mean, with the cum_tsn specified on the *injected* FORWARD-TSN. >> Is that so? > from the test script > +0.0 < sctp: FORWARD_TSN[cum_tsn=99999, ids=[{1, 1}]] > I think so. > > But 99999 is so high relative to the base_tsn of tsnmap, > it overflowed tsnmap, such a big gap is disallowed in linux > sctp. it has to drop this packet. > > /* Verify that we can hold this TSN and that it will not > * overlfow our map > */ > if (!TSN_lt(tsn, map->base_tsn + SCTP_TSN_MAP_SIZE)) > return -1; > > Hi, Julian, maybe you can improve your script by using a lower > value for linux. but this would mean that Linux only supports the peer skipping some small number of TSN's. Isn't this a limitation of the implementation? Best regards Michael > >> >>> >>> Testscript available at: >>> https://github.com/nplab/PR_SCTP_Testsuite/blob/master/forward-tsn/receiver-side-implementation/receiver-side-implementation-11.pkt >> >> >> -- >> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in >> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx >> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in > the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html