Re: [PATCH 2/4] NFSv4.1 Use clientid management rpc_clnt for fs_locations

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On Wed, 2013-08-07 at 18:32 +0000, Adamson, Andy wrote:
> On Aug 7, 2013, at 2:19 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx>
>  wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, 2013-08-07 at 14:04 -0400, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> >> On Wed, 2013-08-07 at 18:01 +0000, Adamson, Andy wrote:
> >>> 
> >>> Here is the attack as described in 3530bis Security Considerations
> >>> section:
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>>   The second operation that should definitely use integrity protection
> >>>   is any GETATTR for the fs_locations attribute.  The attack has two
> >>>   steps.  First the attacker modifies the unprotected results of some
> >>>   operation to return NFS4ERR_MOVED.  Second, when the client follows
> >>>   up with a GETATTR for the fs_locations attribute, the attacker
> >>>   modifies the results to cause the client migrate its traffic to a
> >>>   server controlled by the attacker.
> >> 
> >> You can the exact same thing by changing the READLINK results.
> > 
> > The attack is: change the unprotected LOOKUP results to point to a
> > symlink, then feed '/net/<evil-ip-address>/my/evil/pathname' into
> > READLINK.
> 
> Does the linux client actually follow links with embedded IP addresses?

If you have autofs or amd running on your client, then sure...

-- 
Trond Myklebust
Linux NFS client maintainer

NetApp
Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx
www.netapp.com
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