Re: [PATCH 2/4] NFSv4.1 Use clientid management rpc_clnt for fs_locations

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On Wed, 2013-08-07 at 14:04 -0400, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> On Wed, 2013-08-07 at 18:01 +0000, Adamson, Andy wrote:
> > 
> > Here is the attack as described in 3530bis Security Considerations
> > section:
> > 
> > 
> >    The second operation that should definitely use integrity protection
> >    is any GETATTR for the fs_locations attribute.  The attack has two
> >    steps.  First the attacker modifies the unprotected results of some
> >    operation to return NFS4ERR_MOVED.  Second, when the client follows
> >    up with a GETATTR for the fs_locations attribute, the attacker
> >    modifies the results to cause the client migrate its traffic to a
> >    server controlled by the attacker.
> 
> You can the exact same thing by changing the READLINK results.

The attack is: change the unprotected LOOKUP results to point to a
symlink, then feed '/net/<evil-ip-address>/my/evil/pathname' into
READLINK.

My point is that if you're on a network where the above is a potential
threat, then you should be using krb5i or, better yet, krb5p for _all_
operations. It's not sufficient to single out fs_locations for special
treatment.

-- 
Trond Myklebust
Linux NFS client maintainer

NetApp
Trond.Myklebust@xxxxxxxxxx
www.netapp.com
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