Re: Fw: Rationale for policy check procedure

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On Sat, Jun 28, 2003 at 03:20:59PM +1000, herbert wrote:
> 
> In fact, reading RFC 2367 and 2401 again, the solution is completely
> specified in there :) All tunnel SAs must carry source/destination
> identities with them which will in turn be used to check the inner
> source/destination addresses.

In fact, the information for this is already available in the form
of xfrm_state->sel.  All we need to do is move the state selector
check from xfrm_policy_check to xfrm[46]_rcv_encap.

The selector check in xfrm_policy_check doesn't make sense anyway.
What if I've got an AH transport SA with the a host to host selector
sitting outside an ESP tunnel SA? The check is bound to fail in
xfrm_policy_check.

Cheers,
-- 
Debian GNU/Linux 3.0 is out! ( http://www.debian.org/ )
Email:  Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
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