Re: AMD SEV-SNP/Intel TDX: validation of memory pages

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On 2/12/21 10:22 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> If anyone knows of any way for a HV to inject #VE in the syscall gap,
>> please speak up.  Better to know now.
> Removing and reinserting the SYSCALL page (or any other page touched in the
> SYSCALL gap) will result in a #VE, as TDX behavior is to generate a #VE on an
> access to an unaccepated.
> 
> Andy L pointed out this conundrum a while back.  My hack idea to "solve" this
> was to add an API to the TDX-Module that would allow the guest kernel to define
> a set of GPAs that must never #VE.
> 
> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200825171903.GA20660@sjchrist-ice

Reminds me of the "what has to be mapped into userspace?" exercise for
PTI.  That was fun.

Really, the hypervisor shouldn't be able to cause #VE's.  This should be
fatal to the guest, period.  Or, worst case scenario, Linux should be
able to set a bit that says, I will only run under sane hypervisors.  If
I somehow lose a bet and get a crappy, insane hypervisor, I want take my
ball and go home: don't even bother running me any more.

No way do we want another fragile list of magic pages that we have to
maintain.





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