On Sun, Aug 26, 2018 at 7:20 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > >> On Aug 25, 2018, at 9:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >>> On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 9:21 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 7:23 PM, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On Fri, 24 Aug 2018 21:23:26 -0700 >>>> Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> Couldn't text_poke() use kmap_atomic()? Or, even better, just change CR3? >>>> >>>> No, since kmap_atomic() is only for x86_32 and highmem support kernel. >>>> In x86-64, it seems that returns just a page address. That is not >>>> good for text_poke, since it needs to make a writable alias for RO >>>> code page. Hmm, maybe, can we mimic copy_oldmem_page(), it uses ioremap_cache? >>>> >>> >>> I just re-read text_poke(). It's, um, horrible. Not only is the >>> implementation overcomplicated and probably buggy, but it's SLOOOOOW. >>> It's totally the wrong API -- poking one instruction at a time >>> basically can't be efficient on x86. The API should either poke lots >>> of instructions at once or should be text_poke_begin(); ...; >>> text_poke_end();. >>> >>> Anyway, the attached patch seems to boot. Linus, Kees, etc: is this >>> too scary of an approach? With the patch applied, text_poke() is a >>> fantastic exploit target. On the other hand, even without the patch >>> applied, text_poke() is every bit as juicy. >> >> I tried to convince Ingo to use this method for doing "write rarely" >> and he soundly rejected it. :) I've always liked this because AFAICT, >> it's local to the CPU. I had proposed it in >> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=kspp/write-rarely&id=9ab0cb2618ebbc51f830ceaa06b7d2182fe1a52d > > Ingo, can you clarify why you hate it? I personally would rather use CR3, but CR0 seems like a fine first step, at least for text_poke. Sorry, it looks like it was tglx, not Ingo: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1704071048360.1716@nanos This thread is long, and one thing that I think went unanswered was "why do we want this to be fast?" the answer is: for doing page table updates. Page tables are becoming a bigger target for attacks now, and it's be nice if they could stay read-only unless they're getting updated (with something like this). -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security