On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 03:08:12PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 11:52:37AM +0000, Vikas Chaudhary wrote:
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Date: Wednesday, 13 November 2013 1:18 pm
> > To: Vikas <vikas.chaudhary@xxxxxxxxxx>, Adheer Chandravanshi
> > <adheer.chandravanshi@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Dept-Eng iSCSI Driver <Dept-iSCSIDriver@xxxxxxxxxx>, "James E.J.
> > Bottomley" <JBottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, scsi <linux-scsi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
> > "kernel-janitors@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <kernel-janitors@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: [patch] [SCSI] qla4xxx: overflow in qla4xxx_set_chap_entry()
> >
> > >We should cap the size of memcpy() because it comes from the network
> > >and can't be trusted.
> >
> > This patch is on assumption that data is coming from network,
> > but in this case data come from application (iscsiadm) with correct length.
> >
>
> No, that doesn't work. We don't trust user space.
Btw, the is especially true with network namespaces... These days
anyone who is ns_capable() could overflow the buffer after:
df008c91f835 ('net: Allow userns root to control llc, netfilter, netlink, packet, and xfrm')
regards,
dan carpenter
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kernel-janitors" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
