On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 2:18 PM, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 16:58 -0500, Colin Walters wrote: >> On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> > Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs, >> > then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot. >> >> Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "demo" >> NO_NEW_PRIVS? I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in any >> "container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your patch >> doesn't help with that. >> >> System daemons that do chroot for a modicum of security already start >> privileged, so this doesn't help them either. > > I thought this was all for sandboxing? If a browers (or user) wants to > run some untrusted code, perhaps a chroot is the best way to do so. It > just will break if it needs to access /proc or /dev. And perhaps we > don't want untrusted code accessing /proc and /dev. True. A BPF seccomp filter that disables open, bind, connect, rename, unlink, etc may be better, though. (I like this patch, although I don't think it's at all essential. It could certainly be made more flexible and more useful, but it would get considerably more complicated in the process.) --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
