On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 16:58 -0500, Colin Walters wrote: > On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs, > > then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot. > > Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "demo" > NO_NEW_PRIVS? I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in any > "container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your patch > doesn't help with that. > > System daemons that do chroot for a modicum of security already start > privileged, so this doesn't help them either. I thought this was all for sandboxing? If a browers (or user) wants to run some untrusted code, perhaps a chroot is the best way to do so. It just will break if it needs to access /proc or /dev. And perhaps we don't want untrusted code accessing /proc and /dev. -- Steve -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
