On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs, > then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot. Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "demo" NO_NEW_PRIVS? I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in any "container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your patch doesn't help with that. System daemons that do chroot for a modicum of security already start privileged, so this doesn't help them either. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
