> Well, yes. That's true. But I still don't think revoke() is the
> answer here. For example even without the possibility of hard links
> there's still a race in udev in the following course of events:
>
> open("/dev/foo", O_RDWR)
> ... open passes permission checks
> ... driver gets unloaded
> ... driver intended for other user gets loaded
> ... open finds new driver
> What we really need is to revoke the *inode*, so that it cannot be
> opened any more. Doing it with unlink() and revoke() and requiring
> that link() does not work on the filesystem is a poor and racy
> substitute for that.
Can't argue with that and going through the kernel logic I don't see
anything preventing an exploit based on that from working.
Alan
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