On Fri, 2007-06-15 at 18:24 -0400, Karl MacMillan wrote: > On Fri, 2007-06-15 at 14:44 -0700, Greg KH wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 15, 2007 at 05:28:35PM -0400, Karl MacMillan wrote: > > > On Fri, 2007-06-15 at 14:14 -0700, Greg KH wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jun 15, 2007 at 01:43:31PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Yup, I see that once you accept the notion that it is OK for a > > > > > file to be misslabeled for a bit and that having a fixxerupperd > > > > > is sufficient it all falls out. > > > > > > > > > > My point is that there is a segment of the security community > > > > > that had not found this acceptable, even under the conditions > > > > > outlined. If it meets your needs, I say run with it. > > > > > > > > If that segment feels that way, then I imagine AA would not meet their > > > > requirements today due to file handles and other ways of passing around > > > > open files, right? > > > > > > > > So, would SELinux today (without this AA-like daemon) fit the > > > > requirements of this segment? > > > > > > > > > > Yes - RHEL 5 is going through CC evaluations for LSPP, CAPP, and RBAC > > > using the features of SELinux where appropriate. > > > > Great, but is there the requirement in the CC stuff such that this type > > of "delayed re-label" that an AA-like daemon would need to do cause that > > model to not be able to be certified like your SELinux implementation > > is? > > > > There are two things: > > 1) relabeling (non-tranquility) is very problematic in general because > revocation is hard (and non-solved in Linux). So you would have to > address concerns about that. I think we need to distinguish between relying on restorecond-like mechanisms for the security of SELinux vs. relying on them for emulating pathname-based security. The former would be a problem. The latter is no worse than pathname-based security already, because pathname-based security is inherently ambiguous and non-tranquil, and revocation isn't addressed fully in AA either. > > 2) Whether this would pass certification depends on a lot of factors > (like the specific requirements - CC is just a process not a single set > of requirements). I don't know enough to really guess. > > More to the point, though, the requirements in those documents are > outdated at best. I don't think it is worth worrying over. > > > As I'm guessing the default "label" for things like this already work > > properly for SELinux, I figure we should be safe, but I don't know those > > requirements at all. > > > > Probably not - you would likely want it to be a label that can't be read > or written by anything, only relabeled by the daemon. > > Karl > -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
