Hi! > >>>>I'm not sure if AppArmor can be made good security for the general case, > >>>>but it is a model that works in the limited http environment > >>>>(eg .htaccess) and is something people can play with and hack on and may > >>>>be possible to configure to be very secure. > >>>> > >>>Perhaps -- until your httpd is compromised via a buffer overflow or > >>>simply misbehaves due to a software or configuration flaw, then the > >>>assumptions being made about its use of pathnames and their security > >>>properties are out the window. > >>> > >>How is it that you think a buffer overflow in httpd could allow an > >>attacker to break out of an AppArmor profile? This is exactly what > >>AppArmor was designed to do, and without specifics, this is just > >>FUD. > > > >No, it is not, I already broke AppArmor once, and it took me less then > >one hour. > > > >Give me machine with root shell, and make app armor permit everything > >but reading /etc/secret.file. AppArmor is not designed for this, but > >if you want to claim your solution works, this looks like a nice test. > > > >Actually, give password to everyone, and see who breaks it first. > > you admit that AA isn't designed for this and then you set this as the > test, doesn't that seem unreasonable to you? httpd's run at root priviledge, AFAICT, and Crispin just accused someone of spreading fud. Exploited httpd is root shell. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
