Hi! > >> I'm not sure if AppArmor can be made good security for the general case, > >> but it is a model that works in the limited http environment > >> (eg .htaccess) and is something people can play with and hack on and may > >> be possible to configure to be very secure. > >> > > Perhaps -- until your httpd is compromised via a buffer overflow or > > simply misbehaves due to a software or configuration flaw, then the > > assumptions being made about its use of pathnames and their security > > properties are out the window. > > > How is it that you think a buffer overflow in httpd could allow an > attacker to break out of an AppArmor profile? This is exactly what > AppArmor was designed to do, and without specifics, this is just > FUD. No, it is not, I already broke AppArmor once, and it took me less then one hour. Give me machine with root shell, and make app armor permit everything but reading /etc/secret.file. AppArmor is not designed for this, but if you want to claim your solution works, this looks like a nice test. Actually, give password to everyone, and see who breaks it first. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
