> For SELinux to be effective it has to have a complete policy definition. > This would prevent the OpenOffice access (unless OpenOffice is in the > modify_resolv_conf_t domain) above. This would mean no fully functional root user anymore. My understanding is rather that at least in the Fedora default setup individual applications are confined with targetted policy and root left alone because normal system administrators get very unhappy when root becomes powerless. I was merely pointing out that in this setup path or namespace based access control are much easier to fit in than label based access because they normally don't require changing applications. John's original document also listed some other advantages that I don't need to repeat. In "i don't care if it looks like Unix anymore" security setups like you're describing that's undoubtedly different and labels might indeed work because you forbid just anybody changing them easily. If that makes the users happy is a different question though. I suppose it will keep security consultants employed at least @) Arguably the preserving label issue is not unique to SELinux but also applies to ACLs and other possible uses of EAs, but then people normally don't need to set any ACLs on /etc/resolv.conf. I personally don't like either too much. Path based access control is somewhat hackish and ugly and slow in the current implementation, but I haven't seen an similarly easy to configure solution yet. plan9 like limited namespaces for individual processes initially seem like a nice alternative, but in practice they're also too hard to use and suffer from many of the problems the EA label approach has. But easy to use security is probably better than complicated security because normal people will more likely use it. -Andi - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
