On 17 July 2018 at 03:15, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> Hi Ard,
>
>
>
> On 07/11/2018 05:00 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>
>> On 3 July 2018 at 15:32, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>> SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
>>> flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
>>> when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data
>>> as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active the UEFI runtime data marked
>>> as EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO should be mapped as 'unencrypted' so that both
>>> guest and hypervisor can access the data.
>>>
>>> Fixes: 1379edd59673 (x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted ...)
>>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: linux-efi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # 4.15.x
>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 2 +-
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
>>> b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
>>> index 77873ce..5f2eb32 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
>>> @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t
>>> *md, u64 va)
>>> if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
>>> flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
>>>
>>> - if (sev_active())
>>> + if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
>>> flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
>>>
>>> pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>
>>
>> Is it safe to only update this occurrence and not the one in
>> efi_runtime_update_mappings() ?
>>
>
>
> It's safe to update this occurrence only. The SEV support is added
> in recent EDK2 bios, and the version of bios provides the
> EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_TABLE. Hence the efi_enabled(EFI_MEM_ATTR) check in
> efi_runtime_update_mappings() will always be true. When EFI_MEM_ATTR is
> set the code updates the mapping and returns (see below)
>
> void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
> {
> .....
> .....
>
> /*
> * Use the EFI Memory Attribute Table for mapping permissions if it
> * exists, since it is intended to supersede EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE.
> */
> if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEM_ATTR)) {
> efi_memattr_apply_permissions(NULL, efi_update_mem_attr);
> return;
> }
>
>
> ...
>
> }
>
> The EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_TABLE table does not include MMIO regions, the
> table describes the memory protections to EFI runtime code and data
> regions only. Both EFI runtime code and data should be mapped as
> encrypted. Hence I skipped updating the efi_runtime_update_mappings().
>
Ok, thanks for clearing that up
Queued in efi/urgent
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