SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data
as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active the UEFI runtime data marked
as EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO should be mapped as 'unencrypted' so that both
guest and hypervisor can access the data.
Fixes: 1379edd59673 (x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted ...)
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-efi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # 4.15.x
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 77873ce..5f2eb32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
- if (sev_active())
+ if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
--
2.7.4
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