On Sun, 2013-09-08 at 09:18 -0700, Greg KH wrote:
> I want both, but I don't need signed kexec support because I want to use
> kexec for a program that I "know" is correct because I validated the
> disk image it was on before I mounted it. We already have other ways to
> "verify" things without having to add individual verification of
> specific pieces.
The kernel has no way to know that your kexec payload is coming from a
verified image. It'll just as happily take something from an unverified
image. If you've ensured that there's no way an attacker can call
kexec_load() on an unverified image, then you don't need signed modules.
--
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
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