On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 4:50 PM, Matthew Garrett > <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling >> it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted >> key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to >> relax the restrictions. >> >> However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to >> modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to >> reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering >> the existing restrictions useless. >> >> This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points >> that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement >> of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the >> kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically >> enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger >> guarantee of kernel integrity. >> >> V3 addresses some review feedback and also locks down uswsusp. > > Looks good to me. Consider the entire series: > > Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> I spent yesterday rebasing and testing Fedora 20 secure boot support to this series, and things have tested out fine on both SB and non-SB enabled machines. For the series: Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> josh -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
