----- Original Message ----- > From: "Matthew Garrett" <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx> > To: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Cc: linux-efi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxx, keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx > Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 1:26:01 PM > Subject: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted > > We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling > it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted > key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to > relax the restrictions. > > However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to > modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to > reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering > the existing restrictions useless. > > This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points > that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement > of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the > kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically > enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger > guarantee of kernel integrity. > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in > the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ > Did you purposely exclude similar checks for hibernate that were covered by earlier versions of your patch set? I think you should include it and any patch set that attempts to add support for doing hibernate securely would make appropriate changes. -Lenny. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
