On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 08:00:03AM +0000, James Bottomley wrote: > I agree with this. But I do think the volatile secret key scheme, where > you discard the key immediately after use is the more secure one because > it relies on fewer secrets (and, indeed, no secrets at all after the > event). It's a case where transparency encourages better security > architecture. That somewhat depends what you're securing against. There's an argument that reusing this key is actually sufficiently secure so long as the only way to obtain it is with physical access to the machine - that way you don't have an nvram update cycle every boot. Exposing these variables to userspace doesn't make it impossible to produce a secure system, but it does remove some choices that were previously available. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
