It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context
under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary
access to system memory, so it needs to have a capability check here.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
index 12b62f2..edf0710 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
struct acpi_table_header table;
acpi_status status;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!(*ppos)) {
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
--
1.8.1.2
--
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