On 11/08/2012 09:41 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
On Thu, Nov 08, 2012 at 03:38:33PM +0100, Thomas Renninger wrote:
BTW: Who decides what is allowed and what is not?
Tree maintainers.
I guess it should be the spec. I haven't read the details, but
when even Matthew is not sure, it sounds as if this is phrased
rather imprecise. And as Windows is afaik the central key authority
they can enforce their interpretation of the spec for Linux as well?
The spec is purely mechanism, not policy. Policy is up to the OS
vendors.
I like to have this boot parameter to also work the
other way around:
secureboot_enable=no
and let all secure boot things fall off, only set a
TAINT_INSECURE_BOOT_EVEN_BIOS_REQUESTED_SECURE_BOOT
Can SUSE sign this kernel without fearing to get the key revoked
from Windows?
If anyone used that kernel to attack Windows, the signature would get
revoked.
Can this exist in the mainline kernel?
Sure, but vendors might want to patch it out, depending on how paranoid
they are.
How is secureboot_enable=no ok? Unless we're disabling efivarfs in
secureboot mode root can change the kernel command line.
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