Re: Do not allow MSR or Embedded Controller writes from userspace in secure boot case

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On Thu, Nov 08, 2012 at 03:38:33PM +0100, Thomas Renninger wrote:

> BTW: Who decides what is allowed and what is not?

Tree maintainers.

> I guess it should be the spec. I haven't read the details, but
> when even Matthew is not sure, it sounds as if this is phrased
> rather imprecise. And as Windows is afaik the central key authority
> they can enforce their interpretation of the spec for Linux as well?

The spec is purely mechanism, not policy. Policy is up to the OS 
vendors.

> I like to have this boot parameter to also work the
> other way around:
> secureboot_enable=no
> and let all secure boot things fall off, only set a
> TAINT_INSECURE_BOOT_EVEN_BIOS_REQUESTED_SECURE_BOOT
> 
> Can SUSE sign this kernel without fearing to get the key revoked
> from Windows?

If anyone used that kernel to attack Windows, the signature would get 
revoked.

> Can this exist in the mainline kernel?

Sure, but vendors might want to patch it out, depending on how paranoid 
they are.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
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