On Sun, 2012-11-04 at 13:52 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Sun, Nov 04, 2012 at 09:14:47AM +0000, James Bottomley wrote: > > > I've actually had more than enough experience with automated installs > > over my career: they're either done by paying someone or using a > > provisioning system. In either case, they provision a static image and > > boot environment description, including EFI boot services variables, so > > you can provision a default MOK database if you want the ignition image > > not to pause on firstboot. > > And now you've moved the attack vector to a copy of your provisioning > system instead. Well, no, it always exists: a lot of provisioning systems install efi (or previously dos) based agents not linux kernels. However it's a different vector since the efi agents tend to want to PXE boot and contact the image server. > > There is obviously the question of making the provisioning systems > > secure, but it's a separate one from making boot secure. > > You don't get to punt on making the kernel secure by simply asserting > that some other system can be secure instead. The chain of trust needs > to go all the way back - if your security model is based on all installs > needing a physically present end user, all installs need a physically > present end user. That's not acceptable, so we need a different security > model. I didn't. I advocated a simple security model which you asserted wouldn't allow unattended installs, so I explained how they could be done. James -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
