On 11/02/2012 04:03 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Matthew Garrett<mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 01:49:25AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
When the goal is to secure Linux I don't see how any of this helps.
Windows 8 compromises are already available so if we turn most of these
arguments around I am certain clever attackers can go through windows to
run compromised kernel on a linux system, at least as easily as the
reverse.
And if any of them are used to attack Linux, we'd expect those versions
of Windows to be blacklisted.
I fail to see the logic here. It is ok to trust Microsofts signing key
because after I have been p0wned they will blacklist the version of
windows that has was used to compromise my system?
A key revokation will help me when my system is p0wned how?
It won't help you, it will help everyone else that _hasn't_ been p0wned
already because the affected software will no longer be able to run on
their system.
And it will help you because if someone _else_ gets p0wned then your
system won't be able to run the blacklisted insecure software.
I don't want my system p0wned in the first place and I don't want to run
windows. Why should I trust Microsoft's signing key?
In any case, you don't need to trust Microsoft's signing key...at least
on x86 hardware you can install your own. But if you want consumer
hardware to be able to boot linux out-of-the-box without messing with
BIOS settings then we need a bootloader that has been signed by Microsoft.
Chris
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