Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

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Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

> On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 01:49:25AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
>> When the goal is to secure Linux I don't see how any of this helps.
>> Windows 8 compromises are already available so if we turn most of these
>> arguments around I am certain clever attackers can go through windows to
>> run compromised kernel on a linux system, at least as easily as the
>> reverse.
>
> And if any of them are used to attack Linux, we'd expect those versions 
> of Windows to be blacklisted.

I fail to see the logic here.  It is ok to trust Microsofts signing key
because after I have been p0wned they will blacklist the version of
windows that has was used to compromise my system?

A key revokation will help me when my system is p0wned how?

I don't want my system p0wned in the first place and I don't want to run
windows.  Why should I trust Microsoft's signing key?

Eric
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