> I think it make sense because the private key is still protected by > signer. Any hacker who modified firmware is still need use private key > to generate signature, but hacker's private key is impossible to match > with the public key that kernel used to verify firmware. > > And, I afraid we have no choice that we need put the firmware signature > in a separate file. Contacting with those company's legal department > will be very time-consuming, and I am not sure all company will agree we > put the signature with firmware then distribute. Then you'd better stop storing it on disk because your disk drive is FEC encoding it and adding a CRC 8) It does want checking with a lawyer but my understanding is that if you have a file which is a package that contains the firmware and a signature then there is not generally a problem, any more than putting it in an RPM file - it's packaging/aggregation. This should be referred to the Linux Foundation folks perhaps - no point designing something badly to work around a non existant issue. Also the interface needs to consider that a lot of device firmware is already signed. Nobody notices because they don't ever try and do their own thus many drivers don't need extra signatures in fact. Alan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html